Brief 9: UNDP: Reviving a Practical Human Development Organization by Murphy, Craig N. & Browne, Stephen
Constant reform has characterized the UN Development Programme (UNDP) throughout its 
existence, say the authors of two recent books on UNDP. Change bespeaks an organization ready 
to adapt but also fundamentally uncertain about its proper role. It teeters between two sets of 
tensions—as coordinator of and competitor within the UN development system, and as exerting 
priorities from the center while seeking to be flexible in its program countries. These tensions 
should be resolved, and enable UNDP to be the UN’s sustainable human development organization.
The creation of UNDP was motivated by a post-war logic that developing countries needed 
multilateral technical assistance to fill the gaps in institutions and skills required by what 
was then an ill-defined development process. With the support of the United States, the 
Expanded Program of Technical Assistance (EPTA) was created in 1950 and a Special Fund 
was established in 1959 for pre-investment. When EPTA and the Special Fund were merged 
into UNDP in 1965, the UN development system had a consolidated source of resources to 
finance the technical assistance programs of the specialized agencies.  
But UNDP and other organizations of the system soon discovered they could do without 
each other. UNDP continued to solicit funding from the same developed country donors, 
but instead of channeling all its funds through the agencies, it diversified its spending away 
from the UN system. In the early 1990s, UNDP rapidly withdrew most of its funding from UN 
organizations and specialized agencies, disrupting the system’s flow of services and com-
promising its working relationship with former partners. A growing proportion of its core 
funds earmarked for individual developing countries became “nationally executed,” creat-
ing its own Office for Project Execution. Non-core funds were increasingly devoted to its 
in-house programs, supporting large numbers of its own project staff, many with technical 
specializations identical to those in other UN organizations. UNDP became a microcosm of 
the system that it had originally been established to support. Predictably, the other UN or-
ganizations previously designated as executing agencies successfully mobilized additional 
funding from the same sources.
With no funding center, the atomized UN development effort, comprising some 30 differ-
ent organizations, became disjointed. UN organizations used their financial autonomy to 
expand their field presence with their own representatives and offices, which now number 
over 1,000.1 In the 1970s, by dint of its non-specialist mandate and widespread country 
presence, UNDP had a nominal coordinating role within countries when General Assem-
bly resolution 32/197 designated UNDP resident representatives as “UN resident coor-
dinators” responsible for orchestrating country teams of UN organizations. There was 
little program coherence; and UNDP’s growing financial and operational autonomy led 
the rest of the system to question its credibility.
Human Development Paradigm
In 1990, UNDP published the first of its annual Human Development Reports (HDRs) 
providing an original UN development paradigm as a counterweight to the prevail-
ing “Washington Consensus.” UNDP also began to produce regional and country 
HDRs. Human development went beyond economic, social, environmental and 
other disciplinary facets of development, placing people and their well-being 
at the center. Human development thus encompassed the UN’s entire agenda, 
especially when security was added to the mix in the 1994 HDR on “human 
security.”2 The regional and national HDRs allow local analysts to explore 
issues of particular interest to their part of the world. Reflecting on the Arab 
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2Spring, Fareed Zakaria called the first Arab HDR “the most 
influential book to be published since 9/11.”3
Despite its alignment with UN values, however, human devel-
opment never became the normative focus of UNDP’s opera-
tions. UNDP was a doing, not a thinking, organization of 6,000 
people. Human development was hived off organizationally 
and its practical implications were never clearly articulated. 
Given inter-organizational rivalries, human development was 
not embraced by most other UN organizations, although the 
World Bank uses the umbrella term “human development” to 
encompass education, health, and social protection.4 UNDP 
has continued to produce HDRs—global, regional and country 
—but it is no longer even cited as a theme in UNDP mast-heads. 
In 2000, the UN’s largest summit to date, the Millennium Sum-
mit, concluded with the Millennium Declaration, from which 
were extracted eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
UNDP recognized the importance of the MDGs as the basis for 
a common UN development agenda, and in 2001 began pro-
ducing country reports on their status. The MDGs have become 
yet another focus for UNDP. As UNDP’s evaluations of national 
action relative to MDGs increased, the more bottom-up pro-
cess of producing local HDRs declined (Figure 1).
Two Tensions Revisited
As a development organization in its own right seeking resources, 
UNDP created its own set of “focus areas.” After “sustainable 
human development” others have followed, even though UNDP’s 
traditional strength had been flexibility to the needs of individual 
countries. The resulting clash was between a centrally-driven 
and donor-inspired agenda of development priorities and UNDP’s 
responsibilities to its clients. 
Neither conflict has been satisfactorily resolved. As a “coordi-
nator,” UNDP has become the repository in recent years of new 
funds (including almost 50 “multi-partner trust funds”) on behalf 
of the system. To head off obvious conflicts of interest, sister 
organizations have called for a “firewall” between UNDP’s financial 
management and operational activities. UNDP’s response, physi-
cally separate offices for UN trust funds, has only led to great-
er proliferation. However, these funds are usually channeled 
through UNDP country offices. In some countries, new posts 
of UNDP country directors exist so that the UNDP head is not 
also the UN resident coordinator. More coordinators are also 
being recruited from outside UNDP, and indeed outside the UN 
system. In an ongoing reform process begun in 2006, under the 
title “Delivering as One,” UNDP has, through its chairing of the 
UN Development Group, tried to pursue greater programming 
convergence within the system in some 30 pilot countries. A 
2012 evaluation reported mixed results and an increase in 
transaction costs.6
The tension between centrally and peripherally determined 
priorities results mainly from funding practices. UNDP’s funds 
always have been “voluntary,” and the organization depends 
on discretionary contributions for the permanent staff payroll 
and administrative costs. Core resources have stagnated in real 
terms and were slightly less than $1 billion in 2011, with almost 
all (99 percent) contributed by the 20 largest donors, from the 
OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). In addition, 
UNDP seeks “non-core” contributions that are usually ear-
marked by donors for specific purposes or destinations. These 
non-core resources are the large tail wagging the dog, now four 
times larger than the core resources in a total of close to $5 bil-
lion (see Figure 2). The same 20 DAC donors contributed more 
than $1.4 billion to UNDP in non-core funding, much of it ($1 
billion) for crisis-stricken states. These donor countries generally 
Figure 1: Number of Regional and National HDRs Produced5
3dominate discussions in UNDP’s main governance body, the 
Executive Board, and exert a strong influence on the organi-
zation’s operational agenda. The secretariat has actively pur-
sued additional non-core funding by presenting donors with 
programs likely to appeal to them, thus ensuring a growing 
bilateral orientation, and a top-down rather than a bottom-up 
approach to development.
Other major sources of non-core funding have altered UNDP’s 
character further. Large contributions from other multilateral 
sources, in particular the European Commission and its agencies, 
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and 
the Global Environment Facility, have extended the principal-
agent pathway of development assistance (bilateral-multilateral-
multilateral-country) and expanded UNDP’s role as implementing 
agency. Private funding now accounts for almost one-third of 
UNDP’s budget. A further feature is the channeling of funds 
from emerging countries, particularly in Latin America, to pay 
for services provided by UNDP. These “local resources” (nearly 
$900 million in 2011) further “bilateralize” the organization.
Today’s UNDP has a variable geometry: part UN fund, part 
development organization, part country coordinator, and part 
implementing agency. These various roles prevail at the conve-
nience of the UN member states—acting variously as donors, 
beneficiaries, and commissioners of its services—and a grow-
ing number of multilateral and private funding sources that 
capitalize on its extensive field network and close relationships 
with governments.
The Future
UNDP has adopted several priority themes, or “focus areas,” 
dictated by its funding prospects, which may override publicly 
proclaimed strategies. In the 1990s, environment and energy 
(now protecting the environment) was prompted by UNDP’s 
desire to become a funding recipient (with the World Bank and 
the UN Environment Programme) of the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF). A 2008 evaluation determined that the impact of 
UNDP corporate plans and strategies were inconsequential for 
country programs, whereas “the availability of financial resources 
from GEF has had a far greater influence on the priority setting 
and choice of activities.”8 The availability of substantial funding 
for post-conflict reconstruction led UNDP to establish in 2000 
an entire bureau to mobilize and disburse funds, although it 
overlaps with another focus area, building democratic societies, 
whose team is elsewhere in headquarters. Fighting poverty is 
another catchall priority, originally linked to the marginalized 
human development paradigm. Other priorities have included 
growing national capacity, halting and reversing HIV/AIDS, and 
empowering women. Today, all seven of these so-called priorities 
fall under a new rubric of “empowered lives, resilient nations.” 
Invariably, the multiple reforms have centered on refashion-
ing priorities with an eye to donor appeal. Changes are often 
more semantics than substance, however, because virtually any 
development domain can be included under poverty reduction 
and capacity development. 
Continuing and substantial funding comes first. Yet a more 
important question is the desirability of the status quo. While 
UNDP fiddles, the system burns. UN development is being 
steadily marginalized by the emergence of other multilateral 
organizations and mechanisms, which forces UNDP to demon-
strate its unique appeal. The system is also made more vulner-
able by virtue of its atomization and incoherence. 
One prominent example is the fragmentation in the discus-
sions of the post-2015 development agenda and the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). Considering the wide array of 
institutions involved (including environment-focused organi-
zations such as UNEP), the creation of the High-Level Political 
Forum on Sustainable Development might improve coordina-
tion of the sustainable development agenda (and the future 
monitoring and implementation of SDGs). The UNDP should 
be aware and be part of these conversations, and coordinate 
their efforts with old and newly established institutions in 
order to promote a more coherent, effective post-2015 develop-
ment process.  
The need for a more concerted approach has never been more 
acute, and two options are open to UNDP.  One, it can continue 
to follow the money and rely on the mobilization of maximum 
funding from any source as the main criterion for success. 
UNDP will further broaden its operational reach and subordi-
nate its mandate to those of its main benefactors, eager to capi-
talize on its global network of offices and its close relationships to 
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4developing country governments. With funding tight, this option 
will prove attractive, especially because no UNDP administrator 
wants to preside over a significant funding decline. But this 
myopic option will lead to more incoherence and marginaliza-
tion of the UN development system, and UNDP within it.
Two, a more visionary and ultimately more realistic option is to 
recognize the fundamentally changed development landscape 
and adapt. There is no longer a simple North and South, char-
acterized by aid-givers and aid-receivers. Aid is in retreat. Many 
former developing countries are now major emerging econo-
mies helping to rebalance global power and influence; others 
are more than ever conscious that development is fuelled by 
non-traditional aid sources9 and attach growing importance 
to foreign investment and export opportunities. The need for 
small-scale grants and technical assistance from the UN (which 
many consider a low priority10) is fast diminishing, especially 
when spread thinly over many countries, and this aid is now 
available from a multitude of alternative sources.  
Moreover, UN development is often seen to be most effective 
when it is linked to the other pillars of the system, including 
peace-keeping, humanitarian assistance, rights and justice, 
implying that the organizations of the UN development sys-
tem could most usefully be deployed in the most challenging 
environments. In the context of the post-MDG era, the world 
is seeking a UN system fit for purpose in “the world we want.”11 
That system needs to be a reliable monitor of progress towards 
the new set of guideposts for development progress.
All three realities point to a re-orientation of UNDP, with impli-
cations for its substantive orientation, its funding role, and its 
country presence. 
Substantive orientation: The human development paradigm was 
probably the UN’s most innovative intellectual contribution to 
development.12 It is more than ever appropriate as the intel-
lectual rallying cry for a system attempting to stay relevant in 
complex development situations. Human development encom-
passes social development, sustainability, security, rights and 
justice. UNDP should remain the custodian and propagator at 
all levels of this comprehensive value-based UN paradigm, rather 
than competing with attractive-sounding slogans. Since the 
1990s when UNDP was directed by the celebrated environmen-
talist Gus Speth, the organization has included a commitment 
to sustainability to its foci. Given the current debates about the 
post-MDG sustainable development goals Sustainable Human 
Development may be poised to become the unified paradigm 
of the UN system. The High-Level Political Forum has already 
embraced poverty eradication as the main theme in their first 
meeting, opening up opportunities for a permanent system-wide 
convergence of the sustainability and development paradigms. 
Funding role: UNDP should be the custodian and manager of 
a “sustainable human development goals achievement fund” 
on behalf of the system. A partial model was provided by the 
Spanish Government’s 2006 MDG Achievement Fund. The new 
achievement fund should be multi-donor and not conditional 
by destination and substance. It should gradually replace (by 
consolidation and attrition) all the nearly 50 multi-partner 
trust funds currently managed by UNDP on behalf of the sys-
tem, and funds should be allocated by the UN Development 
Group to individual countries through UN resident coordina-
tors according to needs determined by UN country teams in 
consultation with governments and other local development 
partners. In countries, funds would be allocated to different UN 
(and non-UN) organizations, according to the specific require-
ments of expertise, standard-setting, and other services. 
Initially the achievement fund should be created in parallel 
with UNDP’s other non-core funding but should become the 
sole source of UN technical assistance as the other funds are 
spent down. The focus of UNDP’s expertise at headquarters and 
in its regional offices would align with its focus on governance 
and capacity building—rather than technical specializations 
that reside in other UN organizations. Expertise would support 
UNDP country offices in determining and monitoring local 
capacity requirements.
Country presence: UNDP’s principal role in countries would 
be to support UN resident coordinators and country teams in 
monitoring and reporting on progress towards achieving the 
local targets for sustainable human development (as it has 
with the MDGs). This composition is hardly a radical change as 
UNDP’s country staff are mainly non-specialist project managers 
with monitoring roles, and they already oversee the prepara-
tion of periodic Human Development and MDG monitoring. 
These reports would be combined, as was strongly recom-
mended more than a decade ago.   
UNDP should still manage the UN resident coordinator system, 
continuing to diversify recruitment across the system and out-
side it.
But there would need to be a staff rebalancing. Highest prior-
ity should be given to fragile and conflict-prone states where 
UNDP can combine its staff and financial resources with the 
peace-keeping, humanitarian, and human rights pillars of the 
UN system. In other least developed countries, UNDP could be 
expected to maintain a significant presence. But in the remain-
ing 80 or so middle- and upper-income countries, offices could 
be closed or left in the hands of local liaison personnel. Else-
where there would need to be more consolidation. Currently 
even the smallest UNDP offices are staffed with multiple layers 
in anachronistic hierarchies of representatives, deputies, assis-
tants, junior professionals, and programme officers.  
UNDP has been one of the most innovative UN organizations. 
Its energies need to be channelled away from the competitive 
quest for resources and towards helping to rebuild and re-fund 
a UN development system fit for contemporary purposes.
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